Currently viewing the tag: "Populism"

Sully points us to a post by Francis Fukuyama that I think is pretty right-on-the-money:

Americans with their democratic roots generally do not trust elite bureaucrats to the extent that the French, Germans, British, or Japanese have in years past. This distrust leads to micromanagement by Congress through proliferating rules and complex, self-contradictory legislative mandates which make poor quality governance a self-fulfilling prophecy. The US is thus caught in a low-level equilibrium trap, in which a hobbled bureaucracy validates everyone’s view that the government can’t do anything competently. The origins of this, as Martin Shefter pointed out many years ago, is due to the fact that democracy preceded bureaucratic consolidation in contrast to European democracies that arose out of aristocratic regimes.

I often come back to a line of thought very similar to this when pondering why our modern political system is so dysfunctional. I suspect that one of the big concepts from our always infallible and sainted founding fathers that conservatives want to resurrect is their deep antipathy toward direct democracy:

The Economist loves freedom, as America’s founding fathers did. So democracy has always been, for us and the founding fathers, a “mere” afterthought to liberty, a means not an end. James Madison (pictured), in particular, was wary of even using the word “democracy” lest Americans confuse its representative form with its direct form; he preferred “republic”. So did Benjamin Franklin. Asked by a Philadelphian what form of government the constitution of 1787 had created, he replied: “A republic, if you can keep it.”

While all that sounds lovely in theory, a high-functioning republic is predicated on the good faith of the people holding elected office. When you lose that good faith, either through corruption or wanton acts of nihilism like the current GOP’s filibuster brigade in the Senate, the only way to rectify the situation is through aggressive oversight (yeah, good luck on THAT) or the intervention of more direct democracy. As The Economist notes:

Voter initiatives, referendums and recalls were introduced a century ago during the Progressive era, for good reasons—frontier politics were corrupt and direct democracy was a way to circumvent venal legislatures.

But woe betides the republic that ever abdicates its power into the hands of direct majoritarian dominion:

Since the 1970s, direct democracy has become something very sinister. Starting with California’s infamous “Prop 13″, which capped property taxes and also required two-thirds majorities in both houses of the state legislature to raise any future taxes, voter-initiative industries sprang up in various states that now churn out ballot measures as though by conveyor belt. Getting enough signatures to qualify an initiative for the ballot is easy for sponsors with lots of money, who can afford to pay college students a dollar or more for each signature they collect in a mall. [...]

The result is dysfunction. States with excessive direct democracy, such as California, Oregon and Arizona, now face daunting budget deficits because the recession has exposed the cumulative legacy of past voter initiatives. Voters love schools, hospitals, prisons, and trains. They also hate the taxes that pay for them. Recessions are often triggers of fiscal chaos, whereas ballot-box budgeting is the cause.

The question of how to fix all this is one of the most complicated sociopolitical problems I can imagine.

We live now in an age awash in corporatist corruption, which presumably necessitates ever-greater populism in order to purge our government of hacks beholden only to the donors that keep their bloated, diseased careers afloat.

But, with rampant populism unleashed in 51 distinct and separate incubators, I fear that the competing forces of majoritarianism will never be able to climb down off their ledges and find a way back to whatever level of homeostasis we’ll need to maintain in order to dial back the clock from our mutually assured destruction.

Interesting analysis from Noam Scheiber on Obama’s sorta-populist moment:

But there’s still another explanation, which has to do with racial stereotypes and double-standards. Simply put, a little-known African-American politician who dabbles in edgy populism risks alienating certain white voters, who will view his populism through the lens of race. However the candidate actually intends it, these voters will treat his rhetoric as evidence that he plans to take from white people and give to black people, and, needless to say, they’ll be nudged along in this assumption by the right-wing media. (Fox et al was pretty good at fanning these fears even when Obama’s rhetoric was about as far from populist as you can get).

Three years into his term, by contrast, most Americans have a fairly detailed portrait of the president. He’s no longer a black man they don’t know, but a person they have a relatively intimate relationship with, at least as public figures go. Many, if not most, probably don’t even think of the president in racial terms anymore.

Which is to say, Obama may have finally embraced populism because he finally can embrace populism, whereas it simply wasn’t politically possible before.

I think this is certainly a possibility, but…it’s not the simplest one, which is that the Democratic Party has a deep disdain for populism. To know why that is, I like to think about what would happen if the Democrats fully embraced an authentically populist approach as a party. This is impossible to predict, but I think the following four things would happen in short order:

  1. Democrats would quickly increase their share of the fabled white, working-class vote by a decent margin.
  2. Democrats would probably lose some percentage of the totebagger, Charlie Rose-viewer vote off the bat, though probably less on net.
  3. The political establishment (and its political wing, the Blue Dog caucus) would go absolutely apeshit, attacking Democrats as reverting to the far-left McGovern days and such. Joe Lieberman would have a field day.
  4. Corporate donations would fizzle, putting the party at (more of) a disadvantage when it comes to financing electioneering activities. And it’s hard to see how they make it up.

Now, I’m not necessarily certain that it’s not worth taking the plunge. In fact, post-Citizens United, I think it’s really the only choice. There’s a theory of politics (Jamie Court is pretty eloquent explaining  it) which basically states that the forces of reaction and propping up the status quo are always going to be better-funded than the ones arguing for progress, so instead of playing that game, you play a different one–use anger to mobilize people for change, to basically detonate existing points of pressure and then get out of the way. And this theory has a lot going for it: it’s essentially the dynamic that gets corporations to create safer products and designs a lot of the time, driving progress in that sphere. What’s more, it would effectively force Democrats to rely much more on strengthening unions to compete, which was really where I think the Democrats went wrong in the first place, in paying them lip service to get big corporate money.

But it’s unsurprising that a simple observer and activist would say, “Let’s do it!” while the people responsible for making the party a success do not. And it occurs to me that the Democrats can’t afford to become a populist-reformist party that only occasionally holds power for short periods of time to enact rapid bursts of change, when one considers the shambles that the would-be Republican Party of governance is in right now. There is, I think, little question that populism is a vastly more effective approach for Democrats operating outside of the Coasts. The establishment favored Blue Dog-ish Iraq Veteran Paul Hackett over liberal-populist Sherrod Brown for the Ohio Senate nomination in 2006, and Brown won a surprisingly wide victory that I strongly doubt Hackett would have enjoyed. Democrats strongly stood by doomed Sen. Blanche Lincoln in 2010 when polls showed that the populist alternative trailed by far less. Admittely, Lincoln was in incumbent, but there was no need to spend a single penny in favor of an unpopular, damaged incumbent who was obviously going to lose by Santorum margins in November. None of this is particularly new, and I’ve written about it before, but it still stands. It is my opinion that the Blue Dogs represent mostly the worst aspects of our establishment consensus–deficit peacockery, military hawkishness, wishy-washiness on social issues–but the reason they have stuck around is because the establishment provides them with enormous cover. The Democratic Party has come to rely on this dynamic. But it’s not a very strong foundation for a reformist party, in my opinion.

 

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